The FDA’s Misplaced Priorities

PREMARKET REVIEW UNDER THE FAMILY SMOKING PREVENTION AND TOBACCO CONTROL ACT
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The Tobacco Control Legal Consortium is a legal network for tobacco control policy that works to help communities with tobacco law issues. The Consortium is part of the Public Health Law Center, a national nonprofit law and policy organization that helps health leaders, officials, and advocates use the law to advance public health. The Center is located at Mitchell Hamline School of Law in St. Paul, Minnesota. For more information, call (651) 290-7506 or visit www.publichealthlawcenter.org.

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ABSTRACT
Among other key objectives, the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act was designed to end an era of constant product manipulation by the tobacco industry that had led to more addictive and attractive products. The law requires new tobacco products to undergo premarket review by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before they can be sold. To assess the FDA’s implementation of its premarket review authorities, we reviewed FDA actions on new product applications, publicly available data on industry applications to market new products, and related FDA guidance documents and public statements. We conclude that the FDA has not implemented the premarket review process in a manner that prioritizes the protection of public health. In particular, the FDA has (1) prioritized the review of premarket applications that allow for the introduction of new tobacco products over the review of potentially noncompliant products that are already on the market; (2) misallocated resources by accommodating the industry’s repeated submissions of deficient premarket applications; and (3) weakened the premarket review process by allowing the tobacco industry to market new and modified products that have not completed the required review process.

In 2009, the U.S. Congress passed the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (Tobacco Control Act), providing the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with the authority to regulate tobacco products. As part of that authority, Congress provided that no new regulated tobacco products could enter the market without first undergoing review by the FDA. In a compromise negotiated with the tobacco industry, the law “grandfathers” tobacco products that were commercially available at the time the law was introduced and have not been changed in any meaningful way do not require FDA authorization to stay on the market. However, the law mandates that a manufacturer submit to FDA review before any new product, including new versions of previously available products, can be sold at retail. One aim of the requirement is to address the tobacco industry’s history of manipulating its products to maximize addictiveness and increase attractiveness to consumers and to prevent more harmful products from ever entering the market.

In the six years since the enactment of the Tobacco Control Act, the FDA has failed to implement the premarket review process in a manner that maximizes the protection of public health. Instead, as explained in this Special Communication, the agency has misplaced its priorities, and thereby has undermined the potential public health benefits of tobacco regulation, in three distinct ways. First, rather than prioritize the removal of non-compliant products from the marketplace, the FDA has given precedence to the review of applications that allow for the introduction of new tobacco products. Second, the FDA has accommodated the tobacco industry’s repeated submission of deficient premarket applications, rather than dismissing such flawed applications outright or allowing only reasonable amendments. Finally, even though industry marketing activities are widely publicized, the FDA has failed to prioritize the enforcement of premarket review against companies that have avoided the process entirely and introduced new or modified products to the market without
Authorization. These conclusions are based on our review of FDA actions on new product applications, publicly available data on industry applications to market new products and the agency’s guidance documents and public statements.

**Background on the Tobacco Control Act’s Premarket Review Provisions**

The cutoff date for products that are “grandfathered” and do not require FDA review is February 15, 2007. Any new or modified product introduced after that date must be authorized by the FDA before it can be sold. This includes any entirely new brand or subbrand of a product, as well as any modification to a legally marketed product. Whether the FDA will authorize a new product to be sold depends on the manufacturer’s ability to demonstrate that it has satisfied the criteria for one of the regulatory pathways for new products (figure 1). Under the Premarket Tobacco Product Application (PMTA) pathway, the manufacturer must show that introduction of a new product would be “appropriate for the protection of the public health,” taking into account “the risks and benefits to the population as a whole, including users and nonusers of the tobacco product.” In essence, this requires the applicant to show that, on balance, allowing the sale of the new product would likely reduce tobacco-related harms. The Substantial Equivalence (SE) pathway provides for less rigorous review if a manufacturer can show that its product is nearly the same as a predicate “grandfathered” product. When this pathway is being used, the FDA’s task is to determine whether the product is different from the

![Figure 1: Premarket review pathways. FDA, US Food and Drug Administration; SE, Substantial Equivalence; Premarket Tobacco Product Application.](image-url)
predicate in any way that raises “different questions of public health.” If so, the SE pathway is not available and the product must go through PMTA review before it can be sold. By contrast, if the new product does not raise any “different question of public health,” the FDA will issue an SE Order permitting that product to be marketed.

Although the general rule is that premarket review is required for both the PMTA and SE pathways, the Tobacco Control Act created an exception for SE applications (also termed “SE Reports” by the FDA) submitted by March 22, 2011. Products with SE applications submitted by that date are permitted to be sold while their applications are under review. The FDA calls these applications “Provisional” SE applications, because the products are provisionally on the market. The industry is free to manufacture and sell these products, but if the FDA later determines that such a product is not substantially equivalent to a predicate product, it must be removed from the market.

While the FDA’s SE review process mimics the agency’s SE review of modified medical devices, the administration of that authority ought to look very different in the tobacco context. On the medical device side, the FDA’s mission overlaps significantly with the regulated industry’s goal: to facilitate the provision of safe and effective devices to consumers. It is in the public’s interest to get modified medical devices to market as quickly as possible (so long as they are safe and effective), and it is in a device maker’s best interest to collaborate with the FDA to ensure that its devices have minimal to no unintended consequences. The bad publicity and potential legal liability that comes from a device that causes more harm than good can be exceptionally damaging to a device maker.

By contrast, the SE review process for tobacco products is not designed to ensure that modified products are safe; it is instead intended to ensure that any changes to tobacco products do not create additional public health harms. But because tobacco products are already so harmful, the tobacco industry has little incentive to ensure that this review is effective. The industry will not be penalized by the marketplace for selling products that are marginally more harmful, and because its products are addictive, the industry’s only incentive is to maximize product availability, addictiveness, and appeal and thereby increase sales. Furthermore, unlike in the medical device context, there is no public benefit to rushing new tobacco products to market. Public health gains are likely to accrue only if the SE requirements are rigorously applied and the industry is forced to go through the more rigorous PMTA process when appropriate. Thus, the FDA and the tobacco industry do not share a common set of interests; the FDA’s goal should be to ensure that the SE requirements are scrupulously enforced, while the industry has every incentive to evade those same requirements. Yet, the FDA’s implementation of the SE review process for tobacco has reflected priorities that are more suitable for the review of devices, where it is an appropriate goal to move new or modified products to the market as quickly as possible. These misplaced priorities are having a significant negative impact on public health.

**Misplaced Priority #1: The FDA Prioritizes the Introduction of New Tobacco Products over the Removal of Non-Compliant Ones.**

The tobacco industry submitted 3,517 Provisional SE applications, nearly all of them in the final few weeks before the March 22, 2011 deadline. This avalanche of applications dwarfs the number of submissions to all other new product pathways in the four years since that deadline, including “Regular”...
The FDA has focused its review on Regular SE applications rather than Provisional SE applications. This prioritization has important implications for public health because allowing new products onto the market through the Regular SE pathway will have no beneficial impact on public health. However, the removal of Provisional SE products from the market could secure public health gains, as any non-compliant products would be found to have raised different questions of public health and thus have the potential to pose new harms to public health. Prioritizing Regular SE applications serves the tobacco industry’s interest in getting new products to the market as quickly as possible and further delays agency action on those products that are already on the market. Given the FDA’s mandate to protect public health in its regulation of tobacco products, the FDA should prioritize the review of Provisional SE applications instead.

The FDA’s prioritization of Regular SE applications over Provisional SE applications can be confirmed by examining FDA public data regarding the status of its reviews. The multi-step SE review process concludes with a scientific review, analyzing the differential characteristics of the new and predicate products. Of the 3,517 Provisional SE applications that have been submitted, the FDA has only initiated scientific review of 645 of them, about 18 percent. By contrast, it has initiated scientific review of 1,904 of the 1,917 Regular SE applications that it has received, more than 99 percent.

Moreover, of the 645 Provisional SE applications that are currently under review, the FDA initiated the review of the vast majority (604) in 2014 or 2015. While this progress is a positive development, all of these applications were submitted in March 2011. For Regular SE applications, scientific review on the first applications began in May 2012 and the agency has steadily initiated review of new applications since then.

The FDA has also publicly confirmed that it is prioritizing Regular SE applications, explaining that this focus is driven by the fact that Regular SE applications represent products that are not currently on the market. There is no public health justification for trying to move new products to the market as quickly as possible. There is no statutory deadline by which the FDA must review Regular SE applications, and focusing on the introduction of new products rather than the removal of non-compliant ones is inconsistent with the goals of the Act and does not protect public health.

The pace of FDA review further exacerbates this problem. If the agency were acting quickly on Regular SE applications, it could eventually clear the backlog of Provisional SE applications, despite not prioritizing them. Although the FDA has taken action to speed
up its review, steady action on Regular SE applications and action on a handful of Provisional SE applications has not yet significantly reduced the backlog with the number of SE applications pending before the agency having remained above 3,500 since March 2011 (figure 3).\textsuperscript{19} The FDA has established performance measures for its review of Regular SE applications and plans to reach a point whereby it would begin its review of all new SE applications as soon as they were submitted.\textsuperscript{24} Notably, however, the agency has not established any performance measures for its review of Provisional SE applications, claiming that it lacks sufficient experience with them.\textsuperscript{12, 25} This justification is nonsensical because the only differences between Provisional and Regular SE applications are (a) the date that the agency received them, and (b) the fact that Provisional SE products are already on the market. Because of the agency’s slow pace of review and focus on Regular SE, rather than Provisional SE applications, the FDA has permitted unauthorized products to remain on the market. Indeed, for more than four years, as many as three thousand tobacco products could be in stores, gaining a foothold in the market, without any determination by the FDA that they have met the proper legal standards.

Reviewing Provisional SE applications might not need to be a top priority if the tobacco industry could be trusted to submit applications only for products that were, in fact, nearly identical to the grandfathered predicate products. Given the tobacco industry’s history of deception, however, this is not an assumption that can safely be made. Moreover, the substantial number of SE submissions received by the FDA immediately before the March 2011 deadline suggests that instead of making a good-faith effort to determine which products were “substantially equivalent” to grandfathered products, the tobacco industry instead sought to keep as many products on the market as possible, regardless of a product’s eligibility for the SE pathway. Indeed, until September 2015, every final FDA decision on a Provisional SE application had found that the product at issue was not substantially equivalent to the predicate product, as the application had claimed (figure 3). In September 2015, the FDA did grant SE orders to 98 products that had undergone a new streamlined review process for Provisional SE applications with only labeling or packaging changes.\textsuperscript{26} However, the remaining backlog of more than 3,000 Provisional SE applications should prompt alarm that there are likely more Provisional SE products still on the market that do not meet the statutory requirements. Use of these potentially non-compliant products is likely increasing overall health harms from tobacco use.

Misplaced Priority #2: The FDA Is Squandering Resources by Repeatedly Accommodating the Industry’s Submission of Deficient Premarket Applications.

It is unclear to what extent the slow pace of the FDA’s review of SE applications is due in part to unnecessary and unwarranted accommodation of the tobacco industry. Under the Tobacco Control Act, it is the applicant’s responsibility to demonstrate compliance with the prerequisites for a marketing order under either the PMTA or SE pathway. Although the FDA can and should assist applicants with understanding the requirements of the Tobacco Control Act, the FDA has squandered resources and further delayed the removal of illegitimate tobacco products from the market by making numerous accommodations to tobacco companies that submitted clearly deficient premarket applications.

This excessive level of accommodation is illustrated...
by the agency’s first action on Provisional SE applications, which was taken in February 2014. The four applications at issue, submitted by the same manufacturer, failed to identify a predicate product to serve as the comparison for the new products.\textsuperscript{27} Because an SE application focuses on the differential characteristics of the predicate and new product,\textsuperscript{10} the failure to identify a predicate product should represent a fatal deficiency in an SE application. However, the FDA did not contact the manufacturer to request the identification of the missing predicate products until March 19, 2013, roughly two years after the applications were submitted.\textsuperscript{27} The agency had eight unsuccessful follow-up communications with the applicant unable to adequately identify the predicate.\textsuperscript{27} The FDA finally issued NSE orders on February 20, 2014, almost three years after receiving the applications.\textsuperscript{27}

The FDA’s extended dialogue regarding a fatally deficient application reveals an important issue. At least some of the manufacturers submitting SE applications either have a significant misunderstanding of the most basic requirements of the process, or they are deliberately attempting to exploit the process. While it is possible that manufacturers did not understand the SE process by the provisional deadline, that is unlikely given the clear guidance provided by the FDA regarding what must be included in an SE application.\textsuperscript{28} It seems more probable that some manufacturers acted in bad faith and knowingly submitted deficient applications. It would be reasonable for the agency to allow an amendment or two to the scientific information included in an application. But as the agency’s information shows, many of the deficiencies focus on the mere identity of the predicate or new product, which ought not be pieces of information that require multiple follow-ups, let alone eight or more as has often been the case. In any event, whether the manufacturer was ill-informed or flouting the law, it is the FDA’s responsibility to quickly reject fatally flawed applications and remove

non-compliant products from the market.

It is unclear how many other fatally deficient Provisional SE applications are pending before the FDA. According to the agency, there have been significant deficiencies in nearly all of the SE applications it has reviewed.\textsuperscript{12, 13, 15, 21, 29} The agency’s Provisional NSE orders show the scope of these deficiencies (figure 4). For example, FDA orders rejecting 10 Provisional SE applications in May 2015 revealed that neither the new products nor the predicate products were uniquely identified despite at least five attempts to contact the manufacturer.\textsuperscript{30} In August and September 2015, NSE orders were issued for additional Provisional SE products that did not adequately identify the predicate or new products. The August NSE orders were issued to a manufacturer that did not respond to the agency’s 16 attempted contacts over the course of two years.\textsuperscript{31} The September NSE orders were issued to a manufacturer that had notified the agency several years prior that the company had gone out of business.\textsuperscript{32} Even after receiving this notification, the agency continued to request either supplementary information or a formal withdrawal 10 times over a period of more than two years.\textsuperscript{32} In another case, rather than selecting an individual predicate product for its SE applications, as is required by the Tobacco Control Act, R.J. Reynolds (RJR) submitted SE applications identifying “a composite of all cigarettes commercially marketed in the United States as of February 15, 2007.”\textsuperscript{33} Eventually, the agency instructed the manufacturer to amend its SE applications more than two years after they were submitted. When such predicate products were finally identified (after multiple requests from the FDA), they clearly differed in meaningful ways from the new products. (One new product contained a crushable menthol capsule not found in the predicate product.) There is no reason it should have taken the FDA years to act on these applications. RJR’s decision to use the Provisional SE Pathway was dubious, given the obvious weakness of its argument for substantial equivalence. But because it took so long for the FDA

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Manufacturer & Number of Contacts Initiated by FDA & Days on Market with Known Deficiency & Date of First Contact & Date of NSE Order & Nature of Deficiency \\
\hline
Star Scientific, Inc. & 4 & 665 & 11/01/2012 & 06/28/2014 & No side-by-side quantitative comparison of “other features” \\
Eagle River Importers, Inc. & 5 & 744 & 05/06/2013 & 05/20/2015 & New and predicate products not uniquely identified \\
R.J Reynolds Tobacco Company & 7 & 900 & 03/29/2013 & 09/15/2015 & Deficient predicate product information \\
Jash International, Inc. & 8 & 339 & 03/19/2013 & 02/21/2014 & New and predicate products not uniquely identified \\
Pacific Standard Manufacturing Corporation & 10 & 1024 & 11/14/2012 & 09/04/2015 & New and predicate products not uniquely identified \\
LIT Distributor, Inc. & 12 & 923 & 04/04/2013 & 10/14/2015 & New and predicate products not uniquely identified \\
California Clinical Supply Company & 16 & 959 & 12/20/2012 & 08/06/2015 & New and predicate products not uniquely identified \\
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\caption{FDA response to Provisional SE report deficiencies. FDA, US Food and Drug Administration; SE, Substantial Equivalence.}
\end{figure}
to act, this gambit enabled these products to stay on the market for more than four years.

In each of these cases, there was a significant delay between the submission of a Provisional SE application and the first contact between the agency and the applicant (figure 4). This delay is a direct result of the agency’s prioritization, not a result of a lack of agency resources. This is evidenced by the significantly shorter delay in contacting Regular SE applicants and the fact that even though the Provisional SE applications were received first, Regular SE applicants were contacted 11 months earlier. The first Provisional SE applications were submitted to the agency in November 2010 but the first requests for additional information were sent to manufacturers in December 2012, a 25-month delay.\(^\text{17}\) For Regular SE applications, the first submissions were received in late March 2011 but the first requests for additional information were sent in January 2012, only a 10-month delay.\(^\text{23}\) The interconnectedness of the agency’s priority of review and its slow pace of action is important. Together they have prevented the agency from making any appreciable progress in clearing its massive backlog of Provisional SE applications.

The FDA’s overly generous approach to clearly deficient applications further delays an already slow review process. More problematically, it establishes a culture in which there is seemingly no expectation that tobacco product manufacturers comply with the statutory requirements or the FDA’s guidance. If an application is found to be deficient—even in fundamental ways—the FDA will provide the manufacturer with repeated opportunities to modify the application. With the development of a new regulatory scheme, it is not unreasonable for the agency to provide initial feedback and request supplementary information on industry applications. However, it is not the FDA’s responsibility to do the industry’s work. Because the agency is devoting significant resources to accommodating egregiously – and perhaps deliberately – deficient applications, it is more difficult for the FDA to pursue other regulatory actions that might significantly impact public health.

**Misplaced Priority #3: FDA Inaction Is Undermining the Premarket Review Process by Allowing the Industry to Market New, Unauthorized Products.**

Even though the FDA’s slow review of Provisional SE applications has allowed the tobacco industry to continue marketing products that were available before March 22, 2011, manufacturers have been eager to introduce new products after that date. Some companies have even introduced brand new products to the market or significantly modified existing products without any authorization from the FDA, in clear violation of the Tobacco Control Act. Yet, the FDA has thus far failed to take any public enforcement action against these companies.

For example, Philip Morris USA launched Marlboro Black and Marlboro Black Menthol in December 2011.\(^\text{34, 35}\) According to filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the company also began marketing Marlboro NXT in twenty-seven states in September 2012 and expanded the marketing to the remaining twenty-three states in July 2013.\(^\text{36, 37}\) The manufacturer subsequently launched Marlboro Edge in October 2013 and is set to launch Marlboro Midnight in 2015.\(^\text{38-40}\) Similarly, RJR introduced a new brand of heat-not-burn cigarettes, called Revo, in February 2015 and also introduced two new conventional cigarettes, Camel White and Camel White Menthol, in April 2015.\(^\text{41-43}\) Public statements
by the tobacco companies leave no doubt that these products are “new products” that ought to be subject to premarket review. There is also no doubt that the FDA has not issued orders authorizing the marketing of these products (all such orders are made public by the agency). Yet there has been no indication that the FDA has taken any enforcement action related to the marketing of these products, and most of them are still available in retail stores. RJR discontinued Revo because the product did not meet the company’s expectations and the manufacturer has also removed Camel White from the market without a public announcement, but the other products remain available.44-45

In addition to these widely publicized new product releases, smokeless tobacco product manufacturers are making significant modifications to their products, the types of modifications that must be cleared with the FDA prior to marketing. For example, between 2010 and 2011, Marlboro Snus introduced a larger “round tin,” similar in appearance to conventional moist snuff.46 The snus pouches in the “round tin” packaging are larger and contain a higher moisture content than the previous version.46, 47 These changes appear to play a significant role in the level of nicotine and tobacco-specific N-nitrosamines in these products, and therefore have substantial implications for public health.47 Because the FDA does not make such information available, it is not clear whether Altria (Philip Morris USA’s parent company) submitted Provisional SE applications for Marlboro Snus products by the 2011 deadline. If so, these SE applications would have been inappropriate, as these products were clearly modified after February 15, 2007, and any changes after that date that “raise different questions of public health” require a PMTA application, not an SE application. As the FDA has yet to act on any SE applications for Marlboro Snus products, it is therefore the case that either (1) Altria is abusing the SE process, aided by the FDA’s failure to review Provisional SE applications in a timely manner, or (2) Altria is marking significant product modifications without the required FDA review, and the FDA has failed to enforce the law in a timely way.

Although the agency ought to be able to, the FDA is not identifying new products entering the market without marketing orders. One readily apparent solution to this problem is for the agency to implement its authority to require a track-and-trace program for tobacco products. Such a system, where each individual tobacco product has a unique identification code or computer chip that allows the agency to track the product from the assembly line to a consumer’s hands, is contemplated by the Tobacco Control Act and public health groups have asked the FDA to implement this authority.48, 49 A thorough track-and-trace system would give the FDA a robust regulatory tool to prevent unauthorized products from entering the market.

It is equally important for the agency to monitor significant changes to existing products, particularly when these changes result in increases to addictive and carcinogenic constituents. Requiring premarket review of new tobacco products is a basic pillar of the Tobacco Control Act’s regulatory structure. If the FDA permits companies—including the major cigarette manufacturers—to modify their products without completing the required premarket review process, why would any company comply with the law? The lack of quick and aggressive FDA action against companies that are brazenly introducing new products and modifying existing ones undermines the premarket review process and fails to protect public health.
Policy Recommendations and Conclusion

The FDA has significant opportunities to improve the premarket review process to better protect public health. The authors suggest the following steps for immediate, impactful changes:

1. The FDA should reverse its prioritization of Regular over Provisional SE applications. Provisional SE products that are currently on the market have been given a free pass for more than four years, despite the fact that many of them likely do not meet the legal test for substantial equivalence.

2. The FDA should immediately identify Provisional SE applications that have failed to identify either the new or predicate product. Such applications that have not already been corrected should be given only one attempt to correct the deficiency before the agency issues an NSE order, creating a greater incentive for the industry to submit complete applications.

3. The FDA should establish benchmarks for the length of time a deficient application may remain pending and the number of times the FDA will contact an applicant to seek additional information. When scientific information cannot be corrected within 90 days or the applicant fails to respond to requests for additional information, the agency should promptly issue an NSE order rather than making additional attempts to solicit amendments. The agency must no longer tolerate gross deficiencies; the tobacco industry has had years to correct deficient pending applications and there has been ample information released regarding the types of deficiencies that result in NSE orders. This is true even for applicants who have not been contacted regarding deficiencies.

4. The FDA should begin monitoring the tobacco product market more closely. In order to do so, the agency should implement a robust track-and-trace system. The FDA should also begin regularly reviewing tobacco industry public announcements and biannual manufacturer registrations with the agency so that it can quickly identify and take enforcement action to remove any products that enter the market without authorization.

5. To increase the participation of the public health community, the FDA should make its premarket review activities more transparent and provide educational materials designed for the public health community. For all NSE orders, the FDA should publish the full applications with minimal redactions (only those required by law). The FDA should also publish the product names from all Provisional SE applications that have been submitted. Similarly, the FDA should also identify any products that have been certified as grandfathered tobacco products. Providing this information will allow the public health community to supplement the agency’s monitoring of the tobacco product marketplace and identify products entering the market without authorization.

The statute requires the FDA to act based on information provided by the applicant and if that information is deficient, the FDA is required to reject an application. Therefore, it is the applicant’s responsibility, not the FDA’s, to ensure that an application is complete and accurate.

The FDA’s premarket review authority rests on the premise that without the express authorization of the agency, no new tobacco product can enter the marketplace. Unless the FDA truly controls entry to the tobacco product market, as the Tobacco Control
Act clearly requires, the public health gains of a review process will be minimal. The agency has had six years to implement a regulatory system, yet is has failed to meet this basic prerequisite for effective regulation. Instead, the FDA has set priorities that undermine its ability to protect the public.

Rather than prioritizing the review of Provisional SE products that have been allowed to remain on the market without any oversight, the FDA has facilitated the introduction of additional tobacco products. Likewise, rather than guard the marketplace from illegal or otherwise unauthorized products, the FDA has wasted resources by giving significant leeway to tobacco companies to correct applications that are grossly incomplete if not deliberately deficient. Significant reform is needed for the FDA to satisfy its obligation to protect public health.

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**What This Paper Adds**

While the Tobacco Control Act has ushered in an era of premarket review of new tobacco products, the FDA’s implementation and enforcement of the premarket review requirements has not fulfilled the agency’s obligation to protect public health.

The FDA’s decision to prioritize the review of Regular SE applications over Provisional SE applications has allowed the industry to keep thousands of unauthorized products on the retail market.

The FDA is providing excessive opportunities to the tobacco industry to correct deficient submissions, leading to significant delays in removing unauthorized products from the retail market.

Despite the premarket review requirements, there is evidence that the tobacco industry is introducing new products that have not been authorized by the FDA and the agency has yet to take an action to stop or prevent this practice despite the fact that the industry’s actions have been made public.
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